This paper develops a general model of private provision of a public good that includes the option to consume an impure public good. I use the model to investigate positive and normative consequences of "green markets." Green markets give consumers a new choice: instead of simply consuming a private good and making a donation to an environmental public good, consumers can purchase an impure public good that produces characteristics of both activities jointly. Many governments, nongovernmental organizations, and industries promote green markets as a decentralized mechanism of environmental policy. Nevertheless, I show that under quite reasonable assumptions, green markets can have detrimental e¤ects on both environmental quality and social welfare. I then derive conditions that are su¢cient to rule out such unintended consequences. The analysis applies equally to non-environmental choice settings where the joint products of an impure public good are also available separately. Such choice settings are increasingly prevalent in the economy, with impure public goods ranging from socially-responsible investments to commercial activities associated with charitable fund-raising. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: D6, H4, Q2.
Introduction
The economics literature on private provision of public goods has grown extensively over the last 25 years. The general assumption of theoretical research in this area is that individuals choose between consumption of a private good and contributions to a pure public good. 1 Models based on this assumption establish the essential foundation for understanding privately provided public goods. Yet individuals increasingly face a third option: consumption of impure public goods that generate private and public characteristics as a joint product. This paper addresses fundamental questions about how the option to consume impure public goods a¤ects private provision and social welfare.
Markets for "environmentally-friendly" goods and services exemplify the increased availability of impure public goods in the economy. The distinguishing feature of these markets-hereafter referred to as "green markets"-is availability of impure public goods (i.e., green goods) that arise through joint production of a private good and an environmental public good. Consider two particular examples. First is the growing market for "green electricity," which is electricity generated with renewable sources of energy. Typically, consumers voluntarily purchase green electricity with a price premium that applies to all or part of their household's electricity consumption. In return, production of green electricity displaces pollution emissions from electricity generated with fossil fuels. Thus, consumers of green electricity purchase a joint product-electricity consumption and reduced emissions. 2 The second example is the market for price-premium, shade-grown co¤ee, which is co¤ee grown under the canopy of tropical forests rather than in open, deforested …elds. Shade-grown co¤ee plantations provide important refuges for tropical biodiversity, including migratory birds. Thus, consumers of shade-grown co¤ee also purchase a joint product-co¤ee consumption and biodiversity conservation. 3 More generally, green markets are expanding in many sectors of the economy in response to a willingness to pay premiums for goods and services with environmental bene…ts. According to market research in the United States, green products account for approximately 9 percent of all new-product introductions in the economy (Marketing Intelligence Service, 1999) . Furthermore, expansion of green markets worldwide has prompted green certi…cation, or "eco-labeling,"
programs that cover thousands of products in more than 20 countries (U.S. EPA, 1993; OECD, 1997) . Contributing to these trends is the fact that many governments, nongovernmental organizations, and industries promote green markets as a decentralized mechanism to encourage private provision of environmental public goods.
Beyond green markets, it is now common to see joint products with private and public characteristics of various types. In many cases, …rms simply donate a percentage of their pro…ts to a charitable cause. This practice ranges from goods such as cosmetics and ice cream to services such as credit cards and long-distance telecommunication. Furthermore, many charitable and nonpro…t organizations …nance their activities, in part, through the sale of private goods, such as theater tickets or magazine subscriptions. 4 Finally, opportunities for "socially-responsible" investing combine a positive externality with investment return. 5 In each of these examples, the joint product forms an impure public good-with private and public characteristics.
In this paper, I develop a general model of private provision of a public good that includes the option to consume an impure public good. Building on the characteristics approach to consumer behavior (Lancaster, 1971; Gorman, 1980) , I assume individuals derive utility from characteristics of goods rather than goods themselves. Individuals have the opportunity to consume a private good and make a contribution to a pure public good, with each activity generating its own characteristic. Additionally, the same private and public characteristics are available jointly through consumption of an impure public good.
The distinguishing feature of the model is the way that characteristics are available through more than one activity. As noted above, the standard pure public good model has only a private good and a pure public good. In the standard impure public good model, Sandler (1984, 1994) assume the private and public characteristics of the impure public good are not available through any other means. Vicary (1997 Vicary ( , 2000 extends their basic setup to enable provision of the public characteristic through donations, but again, the private characteristic of the impure public good is otherwise unavailable. In contrast, the model developed here applies when both characteristics of the impure public good are also available separately, through a private good and a pure public good.
This generalization of the choice setting enables broad application of the model. In the context of green markets-the application I focus on throughout this paper-the model captures the fact that individuals typically have three relevant choices: a conventional (pure private) good, a direct donation to an environmental (pure public) good, and a green (impure public) version of the good that jointly provides characteristics of the other two choices. For example, consumers of green electricity have options to purchase conventional electricity and donate directly to reduce emissions. Similarly, consumers of shade-grown co¤ee have options to purchase regular co¤ee and make donations to conserve tropical biodiversity. 6 After establishing the basic model, I focus the analysis on three key questions. Will green markets actually lead to improvements in environmental quality? How will green markets a¤ect social welfare? And how does the potential for induced changes in both environmental quality and social welfare depend on a green market's size? I then consider extensions of the model involving alternative green technologies and the possibility for "warm-glow," or "joy-of-giving," motives for private provision of public goods.
Several results are quite striking. Despite the intent of green markets to improve environmental quality, I show that under reasonable assumptions, introducing a green market may actually discourage private provision of an environmental public good. Furthermore, introducing a green market may diminish social welfare-even though it expands the choice set over market goods and the production possibilities over characteristics. If, however, a green market is su¢ciently large, or environmental quality is a gross complement for private consumption, these counterintuitive results are no longer possible. Overall, the analytical results have implications for public policy related to the role of green markets as a mechanism to improve environmental quality. The …ndings also apply generally to questions about how increased availability of impure public goods a¤ects private provision and social welfare.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model and analyzes individual behavior. Section 3 describes properties of the Nash equilibrium. For comparison purposes, Section 4 considers the economy prior to introduction of a green market. Sections 5 and 6 compare the economy with and without the green market to analyze green-market e¤ects on environmental quality and social welfare. Section 7 analyzes the in ‡uence of a green market's size, in terms of the number of individuals in the economy. Sections 8 and 9 extend the model to consider alternative green technologies and warm-glow motives for private provision. Section 10 summarizes the main conclusions.
The Model
Following the characteristics approach to consumer behavior (Lancaster, 1971; Gorman, 1980) , individuals derive utility from characteristics of goods rather than goods themselves. Assume for simplicity there are two characteristics, X and Y . Characteristic X has properties of a pure private good, while characteristic Y satis…es the non-rival and non-excludable properties of a pure public good. We can interpret Y as environmental quality. There are n individuals in the economy, and they all have identical preferences. 7 Preferences are represented by a strictly increasing and strictly quasiconcave utility function
where X i is individual i's private consumption of X, and Y is aggregate provision of environmental quality. Speci…cally, Y´P n i=1 Y i , where Y i is individual i's private provision. 8 7 Extending the model to incorporate heterogenous preferences is straightforward, but the extension only complicates notation with no change in the main results.
8 Two things should be noted about the speci…cation of preferences. First, individuals only care about private provision of Y , which is the focus of this paper. Utility functions could, of course, be modi…ed to account for other sources of Y , such as naturally given levels of environmental quality and provision through public policy. Second, individuals care only about aggregate provision, and derive no "warm-glow" bene…t from their own level Each individual is endowed with exogenous wealth w i , which can be allocated among three market activities: consumption of a conventional good c that generates characteristic X, a direct donation d to improve environmental quality Y , and consumption of a green (or impure public) good g that generates X and Y jointly. To simplify notation, choose units of c, d, and g such that one dollar buys one unit of each. Furthermore, choose units of X and Y such that one unit of c generates one unit of X, and one unit of d generates one unit of Y . Then let ® > 0 and¯> 0 characterize the green technology such that one unit of g generates ® units of X and¯units of Y . Finally, assume the relationships between market goods and characteristics are determined exogenously and are known by all individuals.
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In order to ensure the most interesting case, whereby c, d, and g are all viable in the market, further assumptions about the green technology are necessary.
This assumption implies that c is the most e¢cient way to generate only X (part i), d is the most e¢cient way to generate only Y (part ii), and g is the most e¢cient way to generate both X and Y (part iii). Therefore, depending on demand for characteristics, all three goods may be a viable alternative in the market. 10 Consider the maximization problem for each individual under the assumption of Nash behavior. Individuals choose non-negative quantities of goods to solve
where i subscripts indicate individual i's consumption, d ¡i´P j6 =i d j , and g ¡i´P j6 =i g j . The …rst two constraints follow from the choice of units and the green technology. The second conof provision. I extend the model in Section 9 to account for this possibility.
9 This setup is similar to a standard linear-characteristics model (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) , except that characteristic Y is a pure public good. Sandler (1984, 1994) and Vicary (1997 Vicary ( , 2000 use the same approach to model impure public goods. The main di¤erence here is that both characteristics of the impure public good are available separately as well, through a conventional private good and direct donations. 10 In Section 8, I consider the implications of relaxing each part of Assumption 1.
straint also speci…es the interrelationship of each individual's behavior. In particular, the Nash assumption implies that each individual takes d ¡i and g ¡i as given. The third constraint is a standard budget constraint.
Letĉ i ,d i , andĝ i denote individual i's demand for goods, each of which depends on the exogenous parameters (w i ; ®;¯; d ¡i ; g ¡i ). Examination of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for (P1) reveals the following: no individual will ever demand bothĉ i > 0 andd i > 0. The intuition for this result is straightforward. Individuals choose market goods to obtain desired levels of X and Y at the lowest cost. By Assumption 1, g generates X and Y jointly at a lower cost than c and d separately. Therefore, an individual would never demand bothĉ i > 0 andd i > 0, as she could always obtain more X i and Y by increasing g i and reducing c i and d i .
An alternative way to express the individual's problem is with implicit choices over characteristics. This transformation simpli…es the 3-dimensional problem in goods space to a 2-dimensional problem in characteristics space. We have seen that not bothĉ i > 0 andd i > 0; therefore, it is possible to write the budget constraint in (P1) as satisfying two separate inequality constraints:
One or both of these constraints will bind at an optimal solution.
The …rst constraint will bind ifd i = 0, and the second constraint will bind ifĉ i = 0. With these corresponding zero conditions and the identities that
can substitute c i , d i , and g i out of the two inequality constraints. This yields the two budget constraints for the individual's problem with choices over X i and private provision Y i :
where
¡® . In the …rst constraint, ' < 1 represents the implicit price of Y in terms of X when the individual makes trade-o¤s between c and g. In the second constraint,°< 1 represents the implicit price of X in terms of Y when the individual makes trade-o¤s between d and g. Now, since Y ¡i is exogenous in (P2), we can add 'Y ¡i to both sides of the …rst constraint and Y ¡i to both sides of the second. This yields the individual's "full-income" budget constraints.
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Then, (P2) is equivalent to the following maximization problem:
and Y¸Y ¡i ;
where the …nal constraint requires individuals to choose a total level of environmental quality no less than the level provided by others. Figure 1 shows the feasible set in characteristics space for problem (P3). The frontier is piecewise linear with a kink at point E, which is the allocation that arises if the individual purchases g only. The segment EM with slope ¡ 1 ' < ¡1 corresponds to potential allocations when the individual makes trade-o¤s between c and g (i.e., the …rst full-income budget constraint).
The segment BE with slope ¡°> ¡1 corresponds to potential allocations when the individual makes trade-o¤s between d and g (i.e., the second full-income budget constraint).
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We can now use (P3) to solve for each individual's demand for total environmental quality and their own level of private provision. Let f (w i ; Y ¡i ) denote individual i's demand for Y ignoring the inequality constraint Y¸Y ¡i . Then, with the inequality constraint, the individual's demand for total environmental quality can be written aŝ
Subtracting Y ¡i from both sides yields the individual's level of private provision:
This equation states that individuals may free ride withŶ i = 0, or provide a positive amount of environmental quality
11 Full income refers to personal income plus the value of public-good "spillins" from provision by others. See Cornes and Sandler (1996) for more on full income, which is equivalent to Becker's (1974) concept of "social income." 12 The dashed segment BM with slope ¡1 indicates the budget frontier when g is not available, and the individual makes trade-o¤s between c and y. This market scenario is discussed in Section 4.
Note that solving forŶ i is su¢cient to identify demand for X i and all three market goods.
Satisfying both budget constraints implieŝ
It follows that ifŶ i ·¯w i , the individual does not make a direct donation, in which cased i = 0,
i , andĉ i = w i ¡ĝ i . However, ifŶ i¸¯wi , the individual does not consume the conventional good, in which caseĉ i = 0,
Equilibrium
Each individual's best-response function in equation (2) 
Brouwer's …xed-point theorem guarantees existence of at least one such equilibrium. This section goes on to identify a su¢cient condition for uniqueness, and to solve for equilibrium levels of private provision for all individuals.
To begin, it is convenient to de…ne two additional functions. Let f c (w i + 'Y ¡i ) denote individual i's demand for total Y that arises from solving (P3) with only the …rst budget constraint. Also, let f d (w i +Y ¡i ) denote individual i's demand for total Y that arises from solving (P3) with only the second budget constraint.
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Now assume these functions satisfy the following conditions.
This assumption simply requires that both characteristics X and Y are normal: individuals want more of both when they have more full income. The parameters´and ¹ imply that the slope of each function is bounded away from 1 ' and 1, respectively. Assumption 2 di¤ers in an important way from the normality assumption in the standard model of private provision of a pure public good. The standard model makes no distinction 13 Note that both functions are Engel curves with respect to full income and the corresponding implicit prices of X and Y . between characteristics and goods, so the normality assumption applies to the private and public goods directly (see Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, 1986) . In contrast, Assumption 2 applies to characteristics and not goods. As a result, it can be shown that Assumption 2 requires normality of g, while there is no such requirement for c or d. This distinction is important in the context of green markets because it allows the possibility for c to be inferior. It is easy to envision scenarios in which more income induces less demand for the conventional version of a good. 14 A consequence of Assumption 2 is a guarantee that best-response functions have slopes bounded within the interval (¡1; 0]. To see this, rewrite equation (1) using our newly de…ned
The di¤erent terms in this expression correspond to di¤erent allocations on the individual's budget frontier in Figure 1 . Demand for total environmental quality must always satisfyŶ¸Y ¡i . The
by normality of Y .
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Now subtracting Y ¡i from both sides of (3), we can rewrite best-response functions in equation (2) aŝ
With Assumption 2, the slope of this expression with respect to changes in Y ¡i is clearly bounded within the interval (¡1; 0].
14 For example, more income may induce less demand for conventional electricity (or conventional co¤ee) and more demand for green electricity (or shade-grown co¤ee).
15 To see that fd(¢)¸¯wi +Y¡i and normality of Y imply fd (¢) < fc (¢), note that individual i has an endowment at X i = ®w i and Y =¯w i + Y ¡i . The value of this endowment, which is equivalent to full income, depends on the implicit prices of characteristics: mi (pX ; pY ) = pX®wi + pY (¯wi + Y¡i). Demand for Y , ignoring the constraint Y¸Y¡i, can be expressed as a functionŶ (pX ; pY ; mi(pX ; pY )). Then, fd (¢) =Ŷ (°; 1; mi(°; 1)) = Y (1; 1°; mi(1; 1°) ), where the second equality follows because demand is homogeneous of degree zero. It is also the case that f c (¢) =Ŷ (1; '; m i (1; ')). Writing the demand functions in this way, it is clear that the only di¤erence between fd (¢) and fc (¢) is a decrease in pY from 1°> 1 to ' < 1. A standard result of demand theory with endowment income is that if a good is normal and net demand is non-negative, a decrease in the good's own price results in strictly greater demand for the good (see Varian, 1992, p. 145) . It follows that normality of Y and fd(¢)¸¯wi + Y¡i imply fd (¢) < fc (¢).
These bounds on best-response functions are su¢cient for existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. Cornes, Hartley, and Sandler (1999) show this result for the standard pure and impure public good models. Their proof generalizes to the model developed here and is relied upon for the following proposition. Proposition 1. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
With this result, let Y ¤ denote the equilibrium level of environmental quality. We can now solve for each individual's level of private provision
is the equilibrium level of environmental quality with the green market, then there exist three critical levels of income w <w < w such that for all i
The di¤erent possibilities in Proposition 2 have an intuitive interpretation in terms of demand for market goods. Individuals with su¢ciently low income (w i · w) free ride and purchase only the conventional good c. All individuals with greater income provide positive amounts of environmental quality, and their level of provision increases with income. Among these individuals, those with lower income (w i 2 (w;w)) continue purchasing c and provide environmental quality through purchases of the green good g. They spend all their income above w on private provision and face a price of ' for Y , which implies
As income increases, these individuals substitute away from c and toward more g. Eventually, individuals with higher income (w i 2 [w; w]) begin to purchase g only, which implies Y ¤ i =¯w i . Finally, individuals with the highest income (w i > w) continue purchasing g and provide further environmental quality through direct donations d. They spend all their income above w (1 ¡¯) on private provision and face a price of unity for Y , which implies Y ¤ i = w i ¡ w (1 ¡¯). The following de…nition establishes four convenient sets based on the di¤erent possibilities in Proposition 2, along with the corresponding demands for market goods. In particular, sets F, C, G, and D correspond to point M, the interior of segment EM, point E, and the interior of segment BE, respectively.
Model Without a Green Market
In order to analyze the e¤ects of introducing a green market, we must compare the model in the previous section to a model of the economy without availability of the green good g. To capture this scenario, we can simply add a constraint to the preceding analysis. Speci…cally, assume g i = 0
for all i.
Deriving the individual's problem in (P3) with this constraint yields the following:
In contrast to (P3), this problem has a single budget constraint, and implicit prices of X and Y are both unity. Referring back to Figure 1 and holding Y ¡i constant, the frontier of the individual's budget set is the dashed segment BM, compared to BEM when g is available.
Maximization problem (P4) is equivalent to the standard model for private provision of a pure public good. In this case, each individual's optimal choice of total environmental quality can be written as
Then, without the green market, the individual's private provision is
Maintaining normality of X and Y implies 0 < q 0 (¢) · " < 1, which continues to guarantee existence of a unique Nash equilibrium through Proposition 1. 17 We can now solve for each individual's equilibrium level of private provision without the green market. Let Y + denote the equilibrium level of environmental quality without availability of g. Invert q (¢) in equation (5) and add Y + i to both sides. Solving for private provision yields 
This proposition states that if w i · w + , the individual provides no environmental quality and therefore free rides by consuming c only. If w i > w + , the individual spends all her income above w + on private provision, and since the price of Y is unity through donations d, it follows that
Together, Propositions 2 and 3 demonstrate the di¤erences between private provision with and without a green market-or more generally, with and without an impure public good that satis…es Assumption 1. With the impure public good, there are three critical levels of income that distinguish between four potential sets of individuals: those who free ride, those who contribute through the impure public good, those who spend all their income on the impure public good, and those who make a donation. Without the impure public good, however, there is only one critical level of income that distinguishes between two potential sets of individuals: those who free ride, and those who make a donation.
Environmental Quality
We can now analyze green-market e¤ects on environmental quality. The general perception is that introducing a green market will promote private provision of an environmental public good.
This section demonstrates, however, that introducing a green market can actually decrease the privately provided level of environmental quality. Particular outcomes depend on the distribution of income, the green technology, and whether environmental quality is a gross complement (or substitute) for private consumption. This proposition states that with a green market, environmental quality will always increase if no individual makes a donation or purchases the green good only. Furthermore, environmental quality will always decrease if all individuals with positive provision make a donation with the green market, and environmental quality is a gross substitute for private consumption. The second result occurs because the green good induces individuals to reduce their donations and substitute toward more private consumption.
Considering parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 4, it is clear why introducing a green market will, in general, have an ambiguous e¤ect on environmental quality. Availability of the green good changes the relative prices of characteristics. Price e¤ects may then stimulate demand for environmental quality for some individuals, while depressing demand for others. That is, some individuals may move to set C, while others move to set D. 19 In such cases, the net e¤ect on environmental quality, after accounting for spillin e¤ects, is generally ambiguous.
It is important to recognize, however, that a negative price e¤ect on demand for environmental quality is only possible if Y is a gross substitute for X , as in the previous examples. If, on the other hand, Y is a gross complement for X , a more general result is possible.
Proposition 5. Environmental quality will always increase after introducing a green market (i.e., Y + < Y ¤ ) if environmental quality is a gross complement for private consumption.
In this case, introducing a green market unambiguously stimulates demand for Y through the price e¤ect. This induces some individuals to increase their private provision. A consequence of increased provision by some individuals may be crowding out of provision by others. Any crowding out, however, must be less than one-to-one because the increase in spillins further stimulates demand for Y . Therefore, the net e¤ect on equilibrium environmental quality must be positive.
Social Welfare
We have seen the di¤erent ways a green market can a¤ect environmental quality. But how will green markets a¤ect social welfare? Availability of a green good expands each individual's choice set over market goods. The green technology also expands the production possibilities over characteristics. These facts suggest intuitively that green markets should increase social welfare.
This section shows, however, that introducing a green market can either increase or decrease social welfare. 20 The most straightforward case occurs if the green market increases both environmental quality and social welfare. Once again, the example in Figure 2 is representative of a more general result. We saw in Proposition 4 that with a green market, environmental quality will always increase if no individual makes a donation or purchases the green good only. The next proposition, which will be especially useful in Section 7, implies that social welfare must increase as well.
Proposition 6. Introducing a green market will always increase social welfare if provision comes from set C only.
The intuition for this result follows from the interpretation of Figure 2 .
More generally, it is important to recognize that even when a green market increases environmental quality, social welfare need not increase. Introducing a green market may shift the burden of provision from one group of individuals to another, and despite a net increase in environmental quality, those individuals picking up the burden may become worse o¤. Figure 4 provides an example, with individuals 1 and 2 shown in di¤erent panels. Income di¤ers between the two 20 Note that with or without a green market, the equilibrium level of social welfare will fall short of the Paretoe¢cient level. This is because, in both cases, individuals take no account of the external bene…ts of their own private provision of environmental quality. Therefore, conclusions about changes in social welfare are based on whether one ine¢cient equilibrium Pareto dominates another. individuals with w 1 < w 2 .
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Without the green market, w 1 is low enough so that individual 1 free rides entirely on individual 2's provision. They enjoy utility levels U The most counterintuitive possibility arises when introducing a green market actually decreases social welfare. Figure 5 provides an example. 23 Here again, environmental quality decreases, and the reduction in spillins generates a negative income e¤ect for both individuals. In this case, however, the positive income e¤ect from the lower price of X is not large enough to be o¤setting. Therefore, utility declines from U + i to U ¤ i for both individuals, and the equilibrium without the green market Pareto dominates the equilibrium with it. This occurs despite the facts that with the green market, individuals have a broader choice set over market goods, and the green technology expands the production possibilities over characteristics.
As the contrast between indi¤erence curves in Figures 3 and 5 suggests, the greater the marginal rate of substitution between X and Y the greater the possibility for a decrease in 21 Parameter values for this simulation are w1 = 100, w2 = 250, ® = :7,¯= :4, and ½ = :4. Environmental quality increases from Y + = 125 to Y ¤ » = 130:7. 22 It can be shown that this scenario is possible regardless of whether Y is a gross substitute or complement for
X.
23 Parameter values for this simulation are w i = 100 for i = 1; 2, ® = :95,¯= :15, and ½ = :88. Environmental quality decreases from Y + » = 66:7 to Y ¤ » = 36:2.
social welfare. In such cases, the substitution e¤ect is large relative to the income e¤ect from the change in implicit prices.
Finally, we can show that a decrease in environmental quality is necessary for a decrease in social welfare. A decrease in social welfare implies that every individual's environmentalquality spillin cannot increase. In particular, it must hold that Y + ¡i¸Y ¤ ¡i for all i, with a strict inequality for at least one individual. This implies that
In other words, a decrease in social welfare implies a decrease in environmental quality. Therefore, in cases when environmental quality actually increases, we are assured of the following.
Proposition 7: All individuals cannot be worse o¤ with a green market if it increases the level of environmental quality.
Green Markets in a Large Economy
Prior research shows that group size in ‡uences equilibrium results for private provision of a pure public good (Chamberlin, 1974; McGuire, 1974; Andreoni, 1988; Cornes and Sandler, 1996) , an impure public good (Cornes and Sandler, 1984) , and direct donations when an impure public good is available (Vicary, 1997 (Vicary, , 2000 . These …ndings, along with the trend in e¤orts to expand green markets, suggest the importance of understanding how group size may in ‡uence green-market e¤ects on environmental quality and social welfare. This section considers how green-market e¤ects change as the number of individuals in the economy grows.
To begin, we can use Proposition 2 to identify two conditions that must hold in equilibrium.
First, the equilibrium level of environmental quality with a green market must satisfy
where the summands represent provision from individuals in sets C, G, and D, respectively.
Second, the critical level of income w must satisfy
Then taking the inverse of this expression yields Y ¤ = · ¡1 (w). Note that, by Assumption 2, the slope of this inverse function is positive and bounded from above.
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Now consider an economy with an arbitrary number of n individuals and a corresponding vector of endowments (w 1 ; w 2 ; :::; w n ). Given the equilibrium level of environmental quality, denoted Y ¤ n , we can write a function for average, private provision over all i: 25
where w n ,w n , and w n are determined by their de…nitions in Proposition 2 with Y ¤ n . Assume the distribution of endowments is characterized by a continuous probability density function h (w) with support 0 · w · w max . We can then increase the number of individuals in the economy by adding to the vector of endowments with random draws from h (w). Then as n grows large and n ! 1, average provision converges to
where w n ! w 1 ,w n !w 1 , and w n ! w 1 . The …rst equality follows by the law of large numbers. The second equality follows because w n is bounded from above by w max , which implies
The following lemma identi…es a necessary condition for equating (7a) and (7b).
Lemma 1. w 1 = w max .
24 Speci…cally, · ¡1 (w) satis…es 0 < @· ¡1 (w) =@w ·1 ¡'´. 25 This analytical approach is an extension of Andreoni's (1988) technique for the pure public good model. 26 The easiest way to see that w n · wmax for any size n is to recognize that normality of Y implies the wealthiest individual will always have positive provision. Then, there must be some w i such that w n < w i · w ma x for any size n, which implies w n < wmax . This lemma implies that w n ! w max as n ! 1. In words, the critical level of income that distinguishes between individuals who free ride and individuals who have positive provision converges to the maximum level of income in the economy.
The fact that w n converges to w max as the economy grows large has several important implications, which are summarized as follows.
Proposition 8. If an economy has n individuals, a green market, and incomes distributed according to a continuous probability density function h (w) with 0 · w · w max , then the following statements describe the economy as n increases to in…nity: (g) Environmental quality is strictly greater than it would be without the green market; (h) Social welfare is strictly greater than it would be without the green market.
To prove this proposition, we need only review results that have been shown previously. All individuals with w i · w n are free riders (by Proposition 2). Therefore, as w n ! w max , only the wealthiest individuals provide environmental quality, and these individuals comprise a diminishing proportion, 1 ¡ H(w n ), of the population. By construction, Y ¤ n = · ¡1 (w n ), which is …nite as w n ! w max . Then by (7b), average provision decreases to zero. Sincew n = w n ® by de…nition, the fact that w n ! w max impliesw n ! wmax ® > w max . It follows that sets G and D are empty (by Proposition 2 and De…nition 1). That is, no individual makes a donation d or purchases g only. But since provision must be positive for at least the wealthiest individual, provision must come from set C, which includes individuals who consume g and c. Then, since provision comes from set C only, both environmental quality and social welfare must be strictly greater than they would be without the green market (by Propositions 4a and 6).
While parts (a)-(d) of Proposition 8 mirror results of the pure public good model, parts (e)-(h) are novel. A key …nding is that availability of a green good in a larger economy will tend to crowd out direct donations to improve environmental quality. This may explain, in part, why many nonpro…t organizations are increasingly turning toward commercial activities for fund-raising. In large economies, where the incentive to free rider is greater, individuals with positive provision may tend to purchase impure public goods rather than make direct donations.
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In such cases, the only consequence of introducing a green market is a decrease in the implicit price of providing the environmental public good. In a su¢ciently large economy, therefore, introducing a green market unambiguously increases both environmental quality and social welfare.
Alternative Technologies
Thus far we have assumed a green technology that implies g is the most e¢cient way to generate both X and Y , while c and d remain the most e¢cient way to generate only X or Y , respectively. This condition, through Assumption 1, is su¢cient to ensure viability of all three goods. But how do the e¤ects of introducing a green market di¤er with alternative assumptions about the green technology? This section examines the e¤ects of relaxing di¤erent parts of Assumption 1. We will see that the results are simply special cases of the preceding analysis.
Let us begin by relaxing part (i) of Assumption 1. Assuming ®¸1 implies a green technology such that obtaining X through g is weakly more e¢cient than through c. Compared to the conventional good, the green good also has the advantage of generating a positive amount of Y .
It follows that introducing the green market will crowd out all consumption of the conventional good. With the green market, therefore, all individuals move to either set G or D. We have seen already how this situation-which reduces the price of X-can, in general, either increase or decrease environmental quality and social welfare. In a su¢ciently large economy, however, the green-market e¤ects are again unambiguous: both environmental quality and social welfare will increase. To show this, note that no individual is a complete free rider with the green market because there is no consumption of the conventional good. Therefore, Y ¤ n does not converge to a …nite level as n ! 1. Since this is not the case without availability of g, environmental quality must increase with the green market. Social welfare must then increase as well, because in addition to enjoying more Y , each individual's consumption of X i cannot fall. This follows because each individual's minimum value of X i with the green market (®w i through consumption of g) is weakly greater than their maximum value of X i without the green market (w i through consumption of c).
We can now relax only part (ii) of Assumption 1 and use similar reasoning to understand the implications. A green technology with¯¸1 implies that providing Y through g is weakly more e¢cient than through d. Since g also has the bene…t of producing a positive amount of X, introducing the green market will crowd out all direct donations. Therefore, provision can come from sets C and G only, and the latter must be corner solutions of the former. In this case, it is straightforward to show that prior results for provision with only set C still apply. That is, introducing a green market will always increase both environmental quality and social welfare, regardless of the economy's size. 28 Finally, consider the implications of relaxing part (iii) of Assumption 1. If ® +¯< 1, individuals will never consume g, as they could always do better obtaining X and Y separately through c and d. In other words, the green technology is simply not viable. If, however, ® +¯= 1, individuals will be indi¤erent between obtaining characteristics jointly through g and separately through c and d. This follows because the green technology is simply a bundling of characteristics that produces no change in the production possibilities. In this case, it can be shown that the mapping between characteristics and goods is no longer unique with the green market. There are an in…nite number of Nash equilibria with respect to choices over market goods; however, every equilibrium supports the same levels of environmental quality and social welfare. These levels are also identical with and without the green market. Thus, green technologies that simply bundle characteristics and produce no change in the production possibilities will have no e¤ect on environmental quality or social welfare.
Warm Glow
This section considers one further extension of the model. The literature on privately provided public goods suggests that private provision may be motivated by more than concern about the aggregate level of the public good. Of particular relevance to the analysis of green markets is the notion of "warm-glow," or "joy-of-giving," motivations (Andreoni, 1989 (Andreoni, , 1990 Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002) . In general, the idea is that individuals may derive a distinct private bene…t from their own level of private provision. 29 In the context of the model developed here, the idea is that individuals may simply feel good about the act of improving environmental quality through greengood consumption, direct donations, or both. Drawing on the intuition from previous sections, we can show that incorporating warm-glow motives in the model changes little about the main results.
To capture warm-glow bene…ts of private provision, individual utility functions are speci…ed as
where U i remains strictly increasing and strictly quasiconcave. Note that each individual's private provision Y i enters their own utility function twice: once as part of aggregate provision, and again as a private bene…t. In order to focus on the new feature of this setup, assume that lim Yi!0 @U i @Yi = 1. This Inada condition rules out the original setup as a special case. Without a green market, the relationship between goods and characteristics implies that utility functions can be rewritten as
Maximizing this function subject to c i + d i = w i for all i is equivalent to the model analyzed by Andreoni (1990) . In this case, continuing to assume X i and Y are normal with respect to full income guarantees existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the Inada condition implies that all individuals have an interior solution. That is, all individuals make a donation in order to obtain warm-glow bene…ts. Now consider how warm-glow motives change the basic setup of the model with a green market.
Availability of g implies that utility functions can be rewritten as
All individuals maximize this function subject to c i +g i +d i = w i . With Assumption 1, it continues to hold that individuals will never set bothĉ i > 0 andd i > 0. Furthermore, there continues to exist a unique Nash equilibrium. 30 Here again, the important di¤erence with the warm-glow version of the model is that no individuals are complete free riders (i.e., set F is empty). In order to obtain warm-glow bene…ts, every individual will consume some of the green good and possibly make a donation.
What, then, are the e¤ects of introducing a green market when warm-glow motives contribute to private provision of environmental quality? In general, the e¤ects are identical to those shown previously. Green markets can either increase or decrease environmental quality and social welfare.
This follows because individuals continue to face changes in the implicit prices of X i and Y . The particular prices they face depend on whether they move to set C, G, or D. The only di¤erence is that they all have positive demand for Y i , which is simply a third characteristic with the same implicit price as Y .
In a large economy where n ! 1, however, the e¤ects of introducing a green market may di¤er somewhat with warm glow. Without warm glow, we saw that a green market will always increase both environmental quality and social welfare. With warm glow, we can show that a green market can increase or decrease environmental quality, but will always increase social welfare. The change in environmental quality is indeterminate because even as n ! 1, demand for Y i may be strong enough so that some individuals still move to set D, and thereby face a lower price for X. Then if Y i is a gross substitute for X, nothing rules out the possibility for a decline in environmental quality. Surprisingly, this implies that stronger warm-glow motives increase the potential for adverse green-market e¤ects on environmental quality. In contrast, warm-glow implies that social welfare will always increase because all individuals have positive provision, which implies Y ¤ n ! 1 as n ! 1. Then, assuming that lim Y !1 @U i @Y = 0, which is another reasonable Inada condition, the change in utility from a marginal increase or decrease in environmental quality converges to zero for all individuals. Thus, after introducing a green market, the spillin e¤ect on any individual's utility is approximately zero, while the price e¤ect is always positive. The net result is an unambiguous increase in social welfare.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes a new choice setting for private provision of a public good. The model captures the reality that impure public goods are increasingly available in the economy. In contrast to existing models, the model developed here applies when the joint products of an impure public good are also available separately-through a private good and a pure public good. Many new results on privately provided public goods emerge from the model, along with its extensions involving various technology assumptions and warm-glow motives for provision. I apply the model in particular to green markets, which o¤er impure public goods through joint production of a private characteristic and an environmental public characteristic. Green markets …t the model because in addition to the green good, consumers typically have opportunities to consume a conventional version of the good and to make a direct donation to the associated environmental cause. Increasingly, many governments, nongovernmental organizations, and industries promote green markets as a decentralized mechanism of environmental policy. Despite this trend, questions remain about the positive and normative consequences of introducing green markets.
Three of these questions were posed at the outset of this paper. I return to these questions in order to highlight the important conclusions Will green markets actually lead to improvements in environmental quality? In general, green markets that are based on an e¢cient technology will change the level of environmental quality.
The surprising result is that green markets will not necessarily improve environmental quality.
Introducing a green market changes implicit prices of both private consumption and the environmental public good. These price changes may encourage some individuals to provide more of the public good, while encouraging others to provide less. If environmental quality is a gross substitute for private consumption, introducing a green market can either increase or decrease environmental quality. If, however, environmental quality is a gross complement for private consumption, introducing a green market will always increase environmental quality. Therefore, it matters what characteristics are jointly produced in a green good. Finally, environmental quality will always increase if the green technology is such that improving environmental quality is more e¢cient through the green good than through direct donations.
How will green markets a¤ect social welfare? The potential green-market e¤ects on social welfare are also surprising: green markets can either increase or decrease social welfare. The most intuitive possibility is for a green market to increase both environmental quality and social welfare. This will always occur if the green good is more e¢cient than donations as a means to improve environmental quality. Even with an increase in environmental quality, however, situations may arise where some individuals become worse o¤. This follows because introducing a green market may shift the burden of provision from one set of individuals to another. If, on the other hand, the green market decreases environmental quality, the most surprising possibilities emerge.
In this case, social welfare may still increase, due to substitution toward private consumption.
Alternatively, social welfare may decrease-despite the facts that the green market expands both the choice set over market goods and the production possibilities over characteristics.
How does a green market's size in ‡uence its e¤ects on environmental quality and social welfare?
Several of these results are related to established theory on private provision of a pure public good.
Without warm-glow motives, increasing the number of individuals in the economy implies that the proportion of individuals with positive provision decreases, only the wealthiest individuals provide, average provision decreases, and aggregate provision increases to a …nite level. Several other results on the in ‡uence of a green market's size are new. When the number of potential participants in a green market increases, direct donations decrease, and the proportion of aggregate provision through the green market increases. Thus, green markets tend to crowd out direct donations to improve environmental quality. A further result is that in su¢ciently large economies, the e¤ects on environmental quality and social welfare are no longer ambiguous: introducing a green market increases both environmental quality and social welfare. This result, however, di¤ers somewhat if provision is motivated, in part, with warm glow, in which case the green market's size has less in ‡uence on its potential e¤ects.
In conclusion, the increased availability of impure public goods in the economy has both positive and normative consequences. In the context of green markets, this paper demonstrates how these consequences can be counterintuitive. Although green markets are promoted to improve environmental quality and increase social welfare, their actual e¤ects may be detrimental to both.
These results, along with the conditions su¢cient to rule then out, provide new insight into the potential advantages and disadvantages of promoting green markets as a decentralized mechanism of environmental policy. The results also apply more generally to other situations, such as sociallyresponsible investing and charitable fund-raising through commercial activities, where the joint products of an impure public good are also available separately.
Proof of Proposition 1
See Cornes, Hartley, and Sandler (1999) .
Proof of Proposition 2
In equilibrium, equation (3) 
add Y ¡i to both sides, and rearrange to get Y ¤ i = w i ¡ w (1 ¡¯). Substituting these expressions into equation (4) yields equilibrium private provision for all i:
With (A1), we can verify that w <w < w. By de…nition, w <w sincew = w ® and ® < 1. To show thatw < w, recall from equations (3) and (4) 
that if w i ¡w (1 ¡¯)¸¯w i for any level of w i , then w i ¡w (1 ¡¯) < 1 ' (w i ¡ w). Simplifying the …rst inequality yields w i¸w . Combining the …rst and second inequality and rearranging terms yields w i >w. Then, to satisfy w i¸w and w i >w for any level of w i , it must be true that w < w. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Immediate from the text.
Proof of Proposition 4
The following lemma is stated and proved …rst. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
This proof extends the proof of part (a) in Proposition 4. Assume to the contrary that Y +¸Y ¤ .
Then for all i with w i > w + , which includes at least the wealthiest individual (by normality of Y ), the following inequality must hold:
Then by Lemma A1, it must be the case that Y + ¡i > Y ¤ ¡i for all i with w i > w + . It must also hold for all i with w i > w + that
The …rst inequality follows because best response functions have slopes · 0, and we have shown 
Proof of Proposition 6
It is su¢cient to show that U ¡ X + i ; Y + ¢ < U (X ¤ i ; Y ¤ ) for all i. We know from part (a) of Proposition 4 that Y + < Y ¤ . Therefore, we need only show that utility increases even if X 
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose w 1 6 = w max . If w 1 > w max , then w n converges to a value greater than the maximum level of income. It follows that Y ¤ = 0 for some n because Y ¤ i = 0 for all i if w n > w max . This, however, contradicts normality of Y , which requires positive provision from at least the wealthiest individual. Now suppose w 1 < w max . Then there exists a number µ such that w 1 < µ < w max .
As n ! 1, we will observe w i > µ in…nitely often. It follows that The last equality follows by equality of (7a) and (7b) and leads to a contradiction. Therefore, since both w 1 > w max and w 1 < w max lead to contradictions, it must be true that w 1 = w max .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8
Immediate from the text. 
